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The Power of Stakeholders’ Voice:  
The Effects of Social Media Activism on Stock Markets 
 
Abstract 
Building on social movement theory, this study assesses the influence of social media 
activism on the stock market performance of targeted firms. We focus on information 
published on Twitter by two critical stakeholders: consumer associations and trade 
unions. To the extent that social media represent a valid medium to mobilize 
stakeholders’ activism, protests on Twitter may damage firm reputation, leading to 
capital market reactions. Using a corpus of over 1.5 million tweets referring to Spanish 
listed banks, we study the impact of activism by looking at targeted firms’ abnormal 
variations in price and trading volume. Our findings suggest that the Twitter activism of 
key stakeholders has a significant impact on investors’ decisions. Further, our empirical 
analyses indicate that the mechanisms affecting investors’ behavior differ depending on 
the characteristics of the stakeholder group. Hence, this study contributes to 
understanding how social movements influence corporate behavior via social media. 
 
Keywords:  stakeholder engagement, activism, social media, social movement theory, 
banking industry, market reaction  
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1. Introduction 
While the Internet can be a channel to communicate corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) information (Guimarães-Costa and Pina e Cunha, 2008), and engage with 
stakeholders (Unerman and Bennett, 2004), recently social media (SMe) have 
democratized the process of dialogue between companies and stakeholders (Coombs, 
1998; Jansen et al., 2009). The novel role of SMe such as Twitter or Facebook, where 
one-to-one and one-to-many conversations can be held, is relevant because these 
Internet-based networks are beyond the control of companies (Qualman, 2010). 
Stakeholders can initiate and discuss any issue of their interest and engage in dialogue 
about and with the company, in a media characterized by almost immediate and 
worldwide diffusion.   
SMe have become important for mobilizing social activism (Kahn and Kellner, 
2004; Yang, 2013). This is corroborated by anecdotal evidence, such as the more than 
100 million users in 196 countries of the petition website Change.org.3 In this context, 
social activists have found a new voice. While the dialogue with stakeholders has 
become an essential strategy to ensure the financial stability of companies (Ruf et al., 
2001; Alniacik et al., 2011; Vasi and King, 2012; Michelon et al., 2013; Boesso et al., 
2015), the use of SMe also enhances the complexity of managing corporate reputation 
and identity (Bebbington et al., 2008; Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012). 
Despite its growing importance, it is still not well understood whether activism in 
SMe gains sufficient traction to reach the mainstream and represent another pathway of 
stakeholder influences on corporations (Henriques and Sharma, 2005). Initial diffusion 
                                                 
3 Change.org is a web platform where users can start or support a petition. The aim is to create social 
pressure to change things. Change.org website <http://www.change.org/about>, accessed December 
2016. 
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is fast and wide-reaching, but its impact may not be long-lasting and diffusion may stall 
just as fast.4 Building on social movement theory (SMT), and specifically on the work 
of King and Soule (2007), we study the mobilization of activism in SMe and the impact 
of protests started in Twitter. If SMT has traditionally addressed why social movements 
emerge and how they engage supporters in collective action (Carroll and Hackett, 2006), 
we contribute to understanding whether social movements influence corporate behavior 
(King and Soule 2007; Vasi and King 2012). 
While King and Soule (2007) empirically analyze how protests affect market 
reactions of targeted firms, we consider such effect in the innovative context of activism 
in social media, and particularly Twitter. SMe facilitate the presence of organized 
activism and a wide dissemination of campaigns. However, the extent to which SMe 
activism can affect investors’ perceptions and therefore, stock price, is still unclear. We 
look at SMe activism and its impact on abnormal market returns in the Spanish banking 
industry for a period of 187 days (from 14 November 2013 to 19 May 2014). According 
to the Barometer Survey of the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (CIS, 2012), 
Spanish banking institutions are among the main concerns of Spaniards, and Spain has 
assisted to the rise of activism demanding more ethics in finance.5 
Our findings demonstrate that Twitter activism by critical stakeholders, such as 
consumer associations and trade unions, has a significant impact on investors’ 
decisions. Specifically, we identify a significant impact of tweets by trade unions both 
on stock price and trading volume. In contrast, the number of trade unions’ followers 
                                                 
4 Twitter trends represent the most visible topics. They are highly dynamic, since they are determined by 
an algorithm that identifies “the most popular topics at the moment, rather than the topics that have been 
popular for a while or on a daily basis”. Twitter website: FAQs about trends on Twitter 
<https://support.twitter.com/articles/101125>, accessed April 2017. 
5 Europa Press (2013), “Ethical banking grows 60 percent in savings and 20 percent in loans during 
2012”, <http://www.europapress.es/epsocial/responsables/noticia-amp-banca-etica-crece-60-ciento-
ahorro-20-prestamos-2012-20130509131307.html>. Accessed December 2016. 
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does not affect stock prices or trading volume. The mechanisms of influence of civic 
and consumer associations are opposite. These organizations affect investors’ decisions 
through their visibility and influence in social media rather than through the intensity of 
their posts, as we detect a negative effect on stock prices, both under bearish and bullish 
market conditions, when the protest by these associations reaches many Twitter users.  
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we integrate King and Soule’s (2007) 
analysis by considering the influence of SMe activism on the stock market. The lens of 
SMT is innovative as it extends stakeholder theory and thus contributes to a more 
comprehensive vision of the business-society relation (Steurer, 2006). Furthermore, it 
allows better understanding of how stakeholders can put pressure on firms and impact 
market perceptions. As such, it complements prior studies on stakeholder salience, by 
focusing on the power to influence the company (Mitchell et al., 1997; Grafé-Buckens 
and Hinton, 1998; Henriques and Sharma, 2005; González-Benito and González-Benito, 
2010; Bolton and Landells, 2015) by showing that organized, collective and public 
stakeholder power can affect investors’ decision and thus corporate financial 
performance. We also contribute to the social and environmental accounting literature 
and stakeholder engagement stream (Unerman and Bennett, 2004; Onkila, 2011; Boesso 
et al., 2013; Dobele et al., 2014; Rodrigue, 2014; Amran et al., 2015; Rodrigue et al. 
2015; Kumar et al. 2016) by considering a new form of engagement that may have the 
potential to affect firms’ behavior via changing investors decisions in the stock market. 
Finally, our research shows the impacts of SMe activism in the current socio-economic 
context, with the growth of social movement protests in Southern Europe (Sampedro 
and Lobera, 2014), and the development of social networks as predominant 
communication channels, that have remarkably enhanced and transformed social 
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movements (Anduiza et al., 2014). Therefore, it is important to investigate the role SMe 
play as tools that enhance stakeholders’ activism. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide the theoretical 
framework and insights over how SMe activism can affect corporate behavior. We then 
present our formal hypotheses and research methodology. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, which are then discussed in Section 6, concluding the paper. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Social movement theory and corporations 
Social movements arise as collective expressions of complaint or proposals for 
solutions to a problem that affects a particular group (Tilly, 1978). Theoretical research 
highlights the role that social movements play on institutional change in modern 
societies, and propose a framework for convergent research in organizational studies 
and social movements (Davis et al., 2005; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). Hiatt et al. 
(2009) recognize that social activism can harm certain business models, but also provide 
new opportunities. Weber et al. (2009) find that social movements can affect internal 
decision-making processes. Lozano (2015) identifies NGOs activism and stakeholder 
pressure as drivers for corporate engagement in sustainable practices. McDonnell and 
King (2013) detect significant changes in the communication strategy of companies 
under boycott. Specifically, they find that communication is biased towards socially 
acceptable behaviors. Overall, the evidence in this literature is aligned with findings in 
social and environmental reporting (e.g. Cho, 2009; Cormier and Magnan, 2015; 
Vourvachis et al., 2016) and suggests that companies modify their behavior when social 
activists target them (Grolin, 1998).  
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Corporations are institutions of public interest but, unlike governmental 
organizations, are not directly responsible for the welfare of the entire society. As such, 
corporations rarely set up communication channels with stakeholders to effectively 
respond to their claims, so outsiders use alternative means to influence corporate 
decision-making processes. Hirschman (1970) refers to these alternative means as “exit” 
or “voice” strategies: “exit” is a reactive strategy which involves looking for alternatives 
as consumers of products or services (e.g. boycott); “voice”, a proactive strategy which 
aims at changing the behavior of a firm by publicly reporting a situation that causes 
dissatisfaction or discomfort on critical stakeholders. When the group is very 
fragmented and stakeholders constitute an insignificant share of the firm’s base or of the 
consumers of a specific product, exit may be ineffective and voice a better option. 
However, the two alternatives are not mutually exclusive. Even when consumers opt for 
exit, they could still use an expression of voice to make the company aware of the 
claims that motivate their action.  
The expression of stakeholders’ voice as a driver of corporate change represents the 
link between SMT and organizational studies. The recent research on how social 
movements explain changes in corporate behavior has been primarily related to 
employee (see e.g.: Manheim, 2001; Scully and Segal, 2002; Greven, 2003; Raeburn, 
2004), or environmental issues (Lounsbury 2001, Lounsbury et al., 2003). King and 
Soule (2007) instead examine the effect of various activists’ protests between 1962 and 
1990 on abnormal stock price returns, which they suggest is a good indicator of how 
investors react to a focal event. Overall, prior research suggests that mass media in 
general play a catalyst role for the impact that stakeholders’ protests have on business 
decisions (Dobele et al., 2014). While voice is a means for stakeholders to protest, and 
promote changes in business practices, SMe constitute an ideal catalyst for the 
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expression of stakeholders’ voice, since they facilitate the implementation of collective, 
organized and public protest actions. 
2.2. The role of social media in social activism 
The growing penetration of SMe in all areas of life is emerging as a key factor in a 
complex socio-political and economic environment, particularly after the last financial 
crisis and the subsequent European sovereign-debt crisis. In a context of economic 
instability, political unrest, and remarkable social mobilization, SMe constitute a key 
instrument to disseminate social claims of various movements. Several studies have 
examined the role of SMe in processes of political upheaval, especially the Arab Spring 
(Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; Youmans and York, 2012) and #Occupy movements 
(Juris, 2012). However, we still have little information about the role they play on the 
relationship between companies and society, conceived as the stakeholders directly or 
indirectly affected by business activities. 
While prior literature on stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al., 1997) has focused on 
traditional mechanisms for stakeholder power, (Grafé-Buckens and Hinton, 1998; 
Henriques and Sharma, 2005; Dobele et al., 2014), we argue that SMe represents a 
novel medium that channels, catalyzes and, potentially gives rise to, activism. In a 
world where corporations operate globally, SMe offers a unique platform where 
fragmented international constituencies can come together and mobilize. SMe enhance 
and diffuse protests that may otherwise die out, without reaching potential audiences. 
Specifically, SMe protests fulfill the three requirements of social movements: they are 
collective, organized and public.  
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First, SMe protests are (a) collective. Social movements need to involve a sufficient 
(but variable) number of stakeholders. In the work of Lipsky (1968), activist groups 
involve no more than 10 people at any given protest. King and Soule (2007) simply 
require any protest to involve more than one person, and the average size of their protest 
samples is 90 people. Large protests have greater impacts, as they can grab the attention 
of authorities and media coverage (Lipsky, 1968; Baron, 2005) and thus reach the wider 
public. Large protests are more threatening, since they could bring greater disruption to 
their targets (Earl et al. 2003; 2004). SMe protests are considerably large, as the degree 
of involvement is more limited than in person-protesting and the possibility of 
anonymity encourages the participation of reticent individuals, turning it into a ground 
where protests can flourish, without need for clear leadership.6 
A second key element is that protests should be (b) organized. Two aspects show 
the well-organized character of protest actions in SMe. There are several platforms that 
facilitate the organization of on-line protest actions such as: Change.org, Avaaz.org7, 
Oiga.me8 or MoveOn.org.9 These platforms allow the development of organized 
protests and subsequent monitoring. Second, facilitators of traditional protests, such as 
trade unions or consumer associations, are also present in SMe.  
                                                 
6 To illustrate the collective nature of protests in social media, on February 2016, out of the 200 most 
recent petitions on Change.org Spain, 45.5% reached more than a hundred supporters, and 11.5% had 
exceeded a thousand supporters. On-line activism platforms serve other social networks, mainly 
Facebook and Twitter, to spread the campaigns. Albeit anecdotal, this information supports the 
remarkable mobilization power of social media and the collective nature of their protests.  
7 Website of the on-line activism platform Avaaz.org Spain: <http://www.avaaz.org/es/>, accessed 
February 2016.  
8 Website of the on-line activism platform Oiga.me: <https://oiga.me/>, accessed February 2016.  
9 Website of the on-line activism platform MoveOn.org: <http://front.moveon.org/>, accessed February 
2016.  
10 
 
Finally, protests need to be (c) public. The public nature of these protests is obvious 
by the socializing purpose of social media. Microblogs on Twitter (i.e. tweets) are, by 
default, public. 
3. Hypotheses development 
Whilst the impacts of SMe are still not well understood, recent evidence suggests 
their effects are economically significant. We find anecdotal evidence that on-line 
activism causes changes in corporate behavior. We have identified several cases of 
successful campaigns related to the Spanish banking sector achieving, for example, the 
elimination of bank fees,10 the cancellation of mortgage debt,11 the granting of social 
rent12 or the suspension of evictions.13 
We specifically study the effect of SMe activism on investor’s decisions, and hence 
on stock price, as a means of pressure to bring about changes in corporate behavior. The 
SMe environment meets the two premises of King and Soule (2007) for activist groups’ 
protests to negatively affect stock prices. SMe platforms have a large presence of 
activist groups that achieve rapid dissemination of their protests on the Internet, and can 
involve the main stakeholders.  
Although the relevant literature on this issue is scarce, prior research has 
investigated the influence of SMe on stock markets, although not in terms of collective, 
organized and public protest. For instance, Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) find a 
                                                 
10 Successful campaign on Change.org against ‘La Caixa’ (Caixabank): <https://www.change.org/p/la-
caixa-eliminad-las-comisiones-por-utilizar-la-banca-por-internet>, accessed December 2016. 
11 Successful campaign on Change.org against BBVA: <https://www.change.org/p/bbva-condonadnos-la-
deuda-que-mis-hermanos-y-yo-heredamos-cuando-nuestros-padres-fallecieron>, accessed December 
2016. 
12 Successful campaign on Change.org against ‘La Caixa’ (Caixabank): <https://www.change.org/p/la-
caixa-me-concedan-dación-en-pago-total-alquiler-social>, accessed December 2016. 
13 Successful campaign on Change.org against Banco Popular: <https://www.change.org/p/ayúdame-a-
salvar-a-mi-familia-del-desahucio>, accessed December 2016. 
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positive relationship between Internet message board activity in financial forums and 
abnormal stock returns and trading volume. Blankespoor et al. (2014) show that the use 
of Twitter to disseminate news by non-visible companies increases the liquidity of their 
securities. Wei et al. (2016) show that Twitter volume spikes are useful to assist stock 
options trading. Furthermore, various authors find a correlation between collective 
sentiment on Twitter and several market indicators suggesting that this microblogging 
network can predict future movements in stock markets (Bollen et al., 2011; Joseph et 
al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014). According to Luo et al. (2013), the predictive value of 
SMe is even faster than other conventional on-line media. 
Following the above discussion, we expect that market participants perceive social 
mobilization protests on SMe as damaging to corporate reputation, leading to capital 
markets reactions. We predict that the intrinsic characteristics of the protest, such (1) its 
intensity and (2) its visibility, are predictors of capital market reactions to SMe protests. 
Thus, we formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1: The intensity of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media is associated with a negative price reaction for the target firm. 
Hypothesis 2: The visibility of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media is associated with a negative price reaction for the target firm. 
Prior literature shows that investors’ reaction to surprises is significantly stronger in 
bear markets than in bullish market conditions (Chen, 2007; Kurov, 2010). In other 
words, when share prices are continuously dropping, and investors believe this 
downward trend will continue in the long run (bear market), the effect of bad news (or, 
in our case, of a protest) on the market price will be stronger than when investors have 
faith that the positive trend will continue (bull market). Thus, we posit that market bear 
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vs. bullish conditions affect the relation between protest and market reaction, and 
formally state the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: The intensity of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media is associated with a greater negative price reaction under bear than under 
bull market conditions. 
Hypothesis 2a: The visibility of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media is associated with a greater negative price reaction under bear than under 
bull market conditions. 
Second, we argue that stakeholders can affect corporate decision-making process by 
influencing investors’ behavior. Thus, we study the effect of protest on the trading 
volume to provide further insights on different investors’ reactions. Specifically, higher 
trading volume is associated with actions of sophisticated (or informed) investors (e.g. 
institutional investors), rather than uninformed traders (Stickel and Verrecchia, 1994). If 
the protest influences the investment decisions of sophisticated investors, then we would 
expect to see an effect on trading volume. Therefore, we posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The intensity of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media will increase the trading volume of the target firm’s stocks. 
Hypothesis 4: The visibility of the protest disseminated by stakeholders on social 
media will increase the trading volume of the target firm’s stocks. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample and data 
The sample includes the eight banks listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange: Bankia, 
Bankinter, BBVA, CaixaBank, Liberbank, Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell and Banco 
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Santander. We choose this sector because of its high social impact and long profound 
crisis, as evidenced by the rise of important social movements (Castañeda, 2012). 
Amongst these activism initiatives, we can highlight the Platform of People Affected by 
Mortgages (PAH), several platforms of people affected by the fraudulent selling of 
complex financial products to unsophisticated retail bank savers, and the trade unions 
that represent banks’ employees affected by Redundancy Dismissal Procedures. The 
Spanish banking industry is facing an unprecedented scenario, with consumers seeming 
more sensitive to ethics in finance, and CSR becoming an essential tool to meet new 
market conditions and mitigate reputational risk (Gomez-Carrasco et al., 2016).  
The period of analysis comprises of 187 days (from 14 November 2013 to 19 May 
2014), of which 127 are trading days and 60 are weekends or holidays. The sample is 
balanced in such way that each company has a full set of information for the 127-day 
period. Overall, we collected 1,534,435 tweets through a four-phased procedure, 
summarized in Appendix A. The tweets considered for our analysis are only those that 
present a negative tone, as an expression of protest, which were identified manually by 
the authors. Appendix B reports few examples of these tweets. 
Following this extensive and careful data collection on the tweets, for each firm and 
day we compute the following measures: (1) total number of tweets; (2) total number of 
tweets with a hashtag; (3) total number of tweets with a link to a website; (4) total 
number of retweets; (5) the number of followers of the Twitter accounts posting the 
tweets. We also differentiate tweets of two groups of key stakeholders: trade unions, 
and civic and consumer associations. We focus on these groups for two reasons: (1) 
they are the outsiders with strong influence on corporations (King and Soule, 2007), and 
(2) our fieldwork confirms that they are most active terms in Twitter. The most frequent 
keywords (eviction, abusive, giving in payment, affected, unions, strike, demonstration, 
14 
 
activists, rally, protest, police, occupy) and hashtags (#stopevictions, #yeswecan, 
#outrage, #affectedpreferredshares, #floorclause, #noalere - “no to redundancy 
dismissal procedure,” abbreviation in Spanish-, #theywontmoveus) illustrate the general 
tone of protest of the tweets. 
Amongst civic and consumers’ associations, it is worth mentioning the mobilization 
power of the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages or PAH (Spanish: Plataforma 
de Afectados por la Hipoteca), a social movement started to prevent the systematic 
eviction of debtors across Spain, other platforms of retail customers affected by the 
preferred shares case (Zunzunegui, 2014) and ADICAE, the main Spanish association 
specialized in financial issues. Regarding the trade unions, we find that the most active 
accounts in Twitter belong to the organizations with the largest number of members: 
COMFIA-CCOO, FeS-UGT and FESIBAC-CGT. 
The stock market data on daily prices and trading volumes are obtained through the 
Madrid Stock Exchange14 and relevant facts from the Spanish Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CNMV).15 
4.2 Variables and models 
Given the novel setting of our research, we study the protest posted by stakeholders 
on Twitter from a general perspective. Specifically, the flow of information on Twitter 
is permanent and makes hot topics relatively short lasting, taking only a few hours 
before being replaced by more recent ones. As illustrated in Figure 1, given the 
permanent flow, it is virtually impossible to establish fixed windows to delimit the 
                                                 
14 Official website of the Madrid Stock Exchange: 
<http://www.bolsamadrid.es/ing/aspx/Portada/Portada.aspx>. 
15 Official website of the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV): 
<http://www.cnmv.es/portal/home.aspx?lang=en>.  
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market reaction impact of each peak of protest. Thus, given this setting16, we run linear 
regressions models17 with panel data, firm-fixed effects18 and robust standard errors19, 
based on daily observations.  
Insert Figure 1 around here 
We measure the intensity of the protest considering the total number of tweets about 
a bank (tweets), the number of tweets posted by civic and consumer platforms (tweets 
platforms) and by trade unions (tweets unions). We measure the visibility of the protest 
with the number of followers potentially reached by those tweets. Specifically, we 
consider the total number of followers of those tweets (followers), of civic and 
consumer associations (followers platforms) and trade unions (followers unions).  
Our dependent variables are, alternatively, the abnormal return for bank i on the 
trading day t (ARit) or the abnormal trading volume of bank i on the trading day t 
(AVit)20 (see Appendix C for the calculation procedure).  
                                                 
16 The evidence reported later in Table 2 also supports such statement. The correlation between 
shareholder-related tweets and abnormal return (AR) and trading volume (AV) is significant only within 
the same day (tweets stockmarket) rather than when considering shareholder-related tweets from the 
previous day (tweets stockmarket-1). 
17 As in prior literature about social media and stock markets (see e.g., Blankespoor et al., 2014), the low 
R2 values in the diverse regression results show that the explanatory power of the models is reduced, and 
thus no long-run estimates can be derived from them. 
18 We control for idiosyncratic and unobservable factors that may simultaneously cause an abnormal 
return and a greater or smaller amount of tweets and followers. While our sample only comprises eight 
banks, there are remarkable differences between them in terms of size, financial performance, solvency, 
credit rating, exposure to mass media, etc. that cannot be controlled since they remain virtually stationary 
throughout the period of analysis. Therefore, we consider that the fixed effects model is an appropriate 
method to test our hypotheses. Moreover, due to the longitudinal nature of our data, given the small 
number of individuals, most of the variability occurs in the time domain, which also supports our choice. 
19 The modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model detects 
heteroskedasticity in our model. 
20 The only difference with AR regressions relies on the inclusion of an additional control variable, R it-1, 
which is the rate of return for the stocks of firm i on the previous trading day, since prior literature finds a 
significant correlation between remarkable variations of the stock price and the trading volume in the 
following trading day (Gallant et al., 1992). 
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We include as control variables: (1) relevant facts is a dummy variable which 
equals one the day on which the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission 
(CNMV) publishes any relevant fact related to the firm and zero otherwise, and (2) 
tweets stockmarket reflects the number of tweets containing stock price information or 
analysts’ recommendations issued by twitter users other than the stakeholders analyzed 
in the present study. In this way, we take care of any confounding effects related to 
strictly financial information. The models for testing, respectively, H1, H2, H3 and H4 
are as follows: 
(1) ARit = αit + β1 relevant factsit + β2 tweets stockmarketit + β3 tweetsit + εit 
(2) ARit = αit + β1 relevant factsit + β2 tweets stockmarketit + β3 followersit + εit 
(3) AVit = αit + β1Rit-1 + β2 relevant factsit + β3 tweets stockmarketit + β4 tweetsit + εit 
(4) AVit = αit + β1Rit-1 + β2 relevant factsit + β3 tweets stockmarketit + β4 followersit + εit 
We expect β3 (models (1) and (2)) and β4 (models (3) and (4)) to be positive and 
statistically significant. We separately study the impact that our variables of interest 
have in bear vs. bull market conditions (H1a and H2a). As such, we consider abnormal 
losses (ALit) and abnormal profits (APit). We run a logit model, also with panel data and 
firm-fixed effects, in which the dependent variable takes value one when we detect 
strictly negative (positive) abnormal return and zero otherwise21. We expect the β3 
coefficients to be positive and significant in the ALit regression and negative and 
significant in the APit regression (activism on SMe penalizes stock prices by increasing 
losses and reducing benefits). Finally, we expect the effect of SMe activism to be more 
significant in a context of abnormal losses than of abnormal profits. 
 
                                                 
21 In these models, all variables, except for the dummy relevant facts, are logarithmic transformations. 
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5. Results 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. On average, we count 1,000 tweets per 
day. Civic and consumer platforms (tweets platforms) present more than three tweets 
per day, although we see peaks as high as 301 per day (maximum). Unions are less 
active, with an average of less than one tweet per day (tweets unions), and a maximum 
of 19. The use of tweets tagged with the symbol “#” (hashtags) is less common than the 
inclusion of links to external websites (links). While the use of external links serves to 
overcome the limit of 140 characters per tweet, the retweet function serves to forward 
tweets originally posted by one user by another one. Tweets by unions have a wider 
diffusion (retweet unions) than civic and consumer platforms (tweets platforms), with 
more than five retweets per day and a maximum as high as 935 per day. We also detect 
that stakeholders, which represent a small number of the total tweets, use hashtags more 
than average, evidence of the tone of protest of their posts. The civic and consumer 
associations’ Twitter accounts count on average 11,495 followers per observation (firm 
and day) on average, well above the 463 average followers of trade unions’ accounts. 
Regarding the dependent variables, abnormal returns range from -10% to +8%, while 
abnormal trading volume variability is much higher, ranging from 133% to 626%. The 
mean value is zero for both variables. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2.  
 Insert Table 1 around here 
Insert Table 2 around here 
Columns (1) and (4) in Table 3 shows the market reaction around the general flow 
of tweets (tweets) or visibility of the firm (followers), rather than the specific effects of 
the protest (Columns (2) and (3)) and its visibility (Columns (5) and (6)). We start by 
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observing a negative and significant effect on stock prices for the number of tweets (at 
the p<0.05 level) and the number of followers (at the p<0.01 level). These findings 
support the general negative bias of Twitter information related to contested business 
sectors. We find a negative market reaction related to the number of tweets by trade 
unions (tweet unions), and to the followers of civic and consumer associations 
(followers platforms). These associations have a remarkable number of followers in 
Twitter and thus their posts have great visibility. Since their tweets by themselves do 
not show a significant influence on investors’ behavior, we interpret the evidence as 
follows. The negative impact on stock price comes more likely from their power to 
disseminate the protest rather than from the content and intensity of the protest itself. 
The opposite happens with trade unions. These organizations have a long tradition in 
Spain and have historically demonstrated an important power of social mobilization. 
Consequently, despite having a reduced dissemination in SMe, their posts have a 
significant effect on investors’ decisions. These results support H1 in the case of trade 
unions and H2 for civic and consumer associations22. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
Tables 4 and 5 show the examination of, respectively, negative abnormal returns 
(ALit), and positive abnormal returns (APit). For abnormal losses, Table 4 shows that the 
variables related to the followers of civic and consumer associations (followers 
                                                 
22 In order to test whether our main evidence is affected by “rumors” spreading in the market before the 
official date of release of any relevant fact, we have run “placebo” tests, in which we artificially move the 
relevant facts variable, as if the relevant facts were actually out in the public domain one or two days 
ahead of the actual and official release date. Our main evidence remains unchanged. Furthermore, we 
point the attention of the reader to the fact that it is unlikely that any other relevant fact is unaccounted for 
in our models. On Twitter, any breaking news are promptly incorporated into the debate since traditional 
media (newspapers, TV channels, radio stations, etc.) publish tweets with the news as soon as they are 
informed. Hence, the influence of press coverage on stock price is covered by our variable tweets 
stockmarket.   
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platforms) and tweets published by trade unions (tweets unions) retain their negative 
and significant effect on stock price at the p<0.05 and p<0.1 level, respectively. 
Insert Table 4 around here 
Table 5 replicates the analysis for positive abnormal returns, yielding different 
outcomes. The significant effect of trade unions’ tweets (tweets unions) disappears, and 
the negative influence of the visibility of civic and consumer associations in Twitter 
(followers platforms) reduces its significance to the p<0.1. These findings support 
hypotheses H1a and H2a. We conclude that the negative impact of stakeholders’ 
activism in SMe intensifies on trading days with a bearish tendency and tones down 
under bull market conditions. 
Insert Table 5 around here 
Finally, Tables 6 and 7 show the analysis on daily trading volume (H3 and H4), 
using the two metrics for abnormal trading volume explained in Appendix C. The 
results highlight the influence of the tweets published by trade unions (tweets unions), 
which is significantly and positively associated with the trading volume of the affected 
firms the day in which these stakeholders publish their microblogs. This finding 
supports the impact of trade unions’ activism in SMe on informed investors’ decision. 
The SMe visibility achieved by civic and consumer associations through their followers 
(followers platforms) has no significant effect on the trading volume, in contrast with 
findings on stock prices. This evidence may be indicative of a lower influence of civic 
and consumer associations on informed than uninformed investors. 
Insert Table 6 around here 
Insert Table 7 around here 
20 
 
5. Discussion and Implications 
Building on social movement theory, our study is a first attempt to assess the 
influence of stakeholders’ activism on the stock performance of the targeted firms in the 
thriving environment of SMe, which are radically changing the way that companies 
engage their stakeholders (Qualman, 2010). Our findings demonstrate that Twitter 
activism of critical stakeholders, such as consumer associations and trade unions, has a 
significant impact on investors’ decisions, which is consistent with the conclusions 
achieved by King and Soule (2007) for traditional activism. Our empirical analyses 
show that the mechanisms affecting on investors’ behavior depend on the characteristics 
of the stakeholder group. 
We identify a significant and negative impact of tweets published by trade unions 
both on stock price and trading volume. The market reaction is more significant on 
trading days with a bearish tendency than under bull market conditions. This Twitter 
activism also produces significant increases in trading volume, a fact that reinforces the 
importance of this protest on the expectations of informed investors (Stickel and 
Verrecchia, 1994). In contrast, the number of followers of the trade unions’ does not 
significantly affect stock prices or trading volume. We interpret these results as 
investors being interested in the content of trade unions tweets rather than in their 
visibility. Trade unions are well-established in the Spanish socio-economic context, 
where they have historically shown a strong and effective mobilizing power through 
strikes, protests, and boycotts. As such, investors react to their tweets despite the 
relatively small number of followers. 
The mechanisms of influence of civic and consumer associations are opposite. 
These organizations, very active in Twitter and with many followers, indirectly affect 
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investors’ decisions through their visibility and influence in SMe rather than through the 
content or intensity of their posts. In Spain, civic and consumer associations do not have 
a long history and their tweets have less impact on investors. Notwithstanding this, their 
posts are widely distributed and can become “trending topic” (a ranked list with the 
most popular and talked-about topics within a relatively narrow time frame) at regional, 
and even national, level. Consequently, Twitter users, despite of whether they follow or 
not these organizations, can easily read their tweets. Interestingly, we detect a 
significant and negative influence on stock prices, both under bearish and bullish market 
conditions when the protest prompted by these stakeholders reaches many Twitter users. 
The effect on trading volume is not significant, which could mean that the influence of 
consumer associations is not greater on informed than uninformed investors. We leave 
to future research the investigation of this issue. 
Our findings speak about the role of SMe in the relationship between companies 
and their stakeholders, providing evidence that it is an issue that can have financial 
impact even in the short run. Our conclusions may have implications for the extensive 
literature addressing the relationship between social and financial performance (Nakao 
et al., 2007; Callan and Thomas, 2009; Ducassy, 2013; Michelon et al., 2013; Boesso et 
al., 2015; Kumar et al. 2016), as well as studies on CSR (Vos, 2003; Cramer, 2005; 
Welford et al., 2008; Gomez-Carrasco et al. 2016), organizational theory (Ransom and 
Lober, 1999; Bowen, 2000), stakeholder salience (Banerjee and Bonnefous, 2011; 
Haddock-Fraser and Tourelle, 2009) and social movements (Jenkins, 2004). As our 
work focuses on the use of this new communication media that channels activism, it 
opens an exciting avenue for the study of novel ways for stakeholders to influence 
companies’ decision-making processes and enhance the urgency of their claims. SMe 
are accessible to any Internet user, allowing wide dissemination beyond the control of 
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companies and traditional mass media. Therefore, these versatile communication tools 
meet all the main features to bring about changes in the business behavior of the 
targeted firms. 
Like any study, ours is not without limitations. First, we examine the effects of SMe 
activism on stock markets in the Spanish banking sector while future research could 
consider other countries and industries, and thus test the market effect of protest on 
other institutional settings and on different business and societal issues. Secondly, we 
have analyzed a single social network, Twitter. However, prior research detects an 
intense interconnection between the major social networking sites (Muralidharan et al., 
2011), implying that the conclusions of this research could be extended to other popular 
social networks like Facebook. Finally, the pressure on corporations through SMe by 
stakeholders can be part of a more comprehensive strategy including diverse social 
protest actions and it is difficult to isolate the effect of each specific action. While the 
use of firm fixed effects empirically mitigates this concern, future research could 
specifically focus on how different channel for protest may lead to different outcomes 
on the long-term effects on corporate financial performance, by analyzing how social 
media activism affects sales and profitability, and investigate the relationship between 
on-line and off-line activism to separate the effect of each domain and explore the 
synergies.  
Finally, our research may be of interest to corporate decision makers who, once 
aware of the impact of stakeholders’ activism on SMe, can adjust their on-line 
communication policies to the demands of critical stakeholders and mitigate the 
negative market effect of the protests. Social movements can also use our findings to 
plan their protests through social networking sites for greater influence on business 
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decisions. SMe activism usually targets firms’ decision makers, however, as derived 
from our results, they can also influence investors and shareholders, which reveals 
another channel through which they can put pressure on companies. 
Future researchers examining external stakeholders’ influence through social media 
may expand on the findings of this paper by considering the long-term effects on 
financial performance of targeted companies, by analyzing how social media activism 
affects sales and profitability, and also the reaction of companies in terms of reporting 
and actual behavior. Future research might also investigate the relationship between on-
line and off-line activism to separate the effect of each domain and explore the plausible 
synergies between them. 
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Appendix A – Data gathering procedure 
Phase #1: 
Storage of 
information 
(tweets) 
Tweets are stored in a database incorporating the following 
information: (a) search term, (b) identifier code of twitter user, 
(c) date and exact time of the tweet, (d) if applicable, link with 
a previous tweet (retweet or reply) and (e) post or tweet itself. 
Phase #2: 
Systematic 
extraction of 
tweets and 
corpus creation 
An on-line software transforms the files into a list of keywords 
sorted from highest to lowest frequency of use when 
mentioning each banking institution. The process of corpus 
creation is the same for keywords and hashtags (words 
preceded by the “#” symbol, which are labelled in this way to 
get more visibility). Twitter users are also sorted in a list from 
highest to lowest degree of participation. 
Phase #3: 
Content filtering 
Prior to the creation of the final corpus, a data cleaning process 
is performed to delete non-relevant tweets and facilitate the 
subsequent manual coding. 
Phase #4: 
Manual 
classification 
This process consists of associating each keyword, hashtag and 
user to one of the criteria which reflect the issues that primarily 
affect the key stakeholders of the Spanish banking industry. 
This phase is also important to exclude any tweet from 
stakeholder that did not have a relation to the protest being 
analyzed. 
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Appendix B – Examples of protest tweets* 
Civic 
associations  
(tweets platforms) 
1. @15mSantMarti: “Next Friday we’ll continue with social 
pressure to prevent BBVA from evicting Rosa and her 
parents: (link)” 
2. @LA_PAH: “Arrested several @PAHasturias’ comrades 
for demanding @BBVA to stop Loli’s house auction 
#AllwithLoli #BBVAcriminal” 
3. @DRYmadrid: “Because the banks always win, let’s put 
them on their place! Thursday rally in front of Banco 
Santander, Canalejas Square #Santander” 
4. @StopdesahucioGr: “@credimo cheats and scams with the 
help of @caixabank, who still do not give solutions 
@LA_PAH @PAH_Madrid @PAH_Sevilla” 
5. @Info15m: “#returntothesquare Stop Evictions supports a 
family ruined by La Caixa in court: (link) #occupy” 
 
Unions                         
(tweets unions) 
1. @comfia: “New problems for Liberbank: employees 
vacation will go to court (link) #ERE” 
2. @ugtcaixabank: “Extended working hours in Villacis. 
Thanks to the complaint of UGT, the labor inspector 
investigates CaixaBank… (link)” 
3. @lacnt: “Conflict Isban-Banco Santander: Interview with 
workers in struggle in Madrid: Interview with activists… 
(link)” 
4. @Comfia_CyL: “Santander dismisses 3,441 employees in 
14 months (link)” 
5. @CCOO_Sabadell: “CCOO demands to improve the 
working conditions of the workforce to consolidate the 
future of Banco Sabadell. Read more in (link)” 
 
* Translated from the original tweets in Spanish. 
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Appendix C – Calculation of abnormal return and abnormal volume 
• Abnormal return 
We calculate the daily abnormal return (AR) for each bank (i) and trading day (t) by 
applying the formula: ARit = Rit – (ai + bi Rmt), where Rit is the rate of return for firm i on 
day t, and ai and bi are regression coefficients taken from the following expected return 
equation for all observations within the 127-trading day period of analysis: Rit = αi + βiRmt + 
εit 
In this last equation, Rit is the rate of return for firm i for day t, and Rmt is the rate of return 
of IBEX 35, the benchmark index in the Spanish Stock Exchange, for each trading day. αi is 
the rate of return for firm i when the rate of return of IBEX 35 is zero, βi is the systemic risk 
of bank i (i.e., a measure of the volatility of bonds relative to the benchmark) and ε it is the 
serially independent disturbance term whose expected value is zero, E(εit) = 0.  
Rit can be interpreted as the expected return for firm i when the rate of return of the overall 
market portfolio is considered constant or, in other words, the part of the rate of return that 
cannot be explained by variations in the overall market portfolio. 
Abnormal return (ARit) is then calculated as the difference between the actual return for 
firm i in each trading session and the expected return for that session based on its 
correlation with the benchmark index IBEX 35. The difference between the actual and the 
expected rate of return reflects those factors which influence the stock price and cannot be 
explained by overall market fluctuations or by the normal behavior of the stock.  
 
• Abnormal volume 
Similarly to Joseph et al. (2011), abnormal trading volume is calculated through the 
following expression: AVit = (Vit – Vi,avg/Vi,avg), where Vit is the trading volume of firm i on 
day t, and Vi,avg is the average trading volume for firm i over all the period of observation. 
Un-tabulated graphs show a clear predominance of abnormally high trading volumes. The 
positive variations of trading volume are much more accentuated than the negative 
variations.  
We also determine another measure of abnormal trading volume which considers the 
abnormal trading volume of the overall market portfolio, represented by the benchmark 
index IBEX 35, as follows: AV’it = (Vit – Vi,avg/Vi,avg) – (Vmt-Vm,avg/Vm,avg) 
Where Vmt is the trading volume of the IBEX 35 overall portfolio on day t, and Vm,avg is the 
average trading volume of IBEX 35 portfolio throughout the period studied. This permit to 
refine the abnormal trading volume variable excluding the variations that affect the overall 
market.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable1 Obs2 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 AR 1016 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.08 
2 AV 1016 -0.01 0.51 -1.33 6.26 
3 AR-1 1016 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.08 
4 relevant_facts 1016 0.20 0.40 0 1 
5 tweets stockmarket 1438 135.21 418.83 0 5348 
6 tweets stockmarket-1 1437 135.30 418.96 0 5348 
7 tweets 1438 1067.80 1721.73 2 18057 
8 tweets platforms 1438 3.37 12.35 0 301 
9 tweets unions 1438 0.40 1.43 0 19 
10 hashtags 1438 271.96 477.13 0 8077 
11 hashtags platforms 1438 2.05 7.10 0 121 
12 hashtags unions 1438 0.01 0.15 0 3 
13 links 1438 659.71 1055.94 0 9582 
14 links platforms 1438 2.51 10.15 0 301 
15 links unions 1438 0.38 1.40 0 19 
16 retweets 1438 657.89 1449.99 0 18057 
17 retweets platforms 1438 3.90 24.35 0 489 
18 retweets unions 1438 5.51 42.60 0 935 
19 followers 1438 2236802 3548712 0 33300000 
20 followers platforms 1347 11495.55 35290.76 0 383543 
21 followers unions 1347 463.72 1420.63 0 10361 
 
35 
 
Table 2. Pearson correlation matrix 
Variable1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 AR 1.0 
         2 AV 0.01 1.0 
        3 AR-1 0.05 0.07** 1.0 
       4 relevant_facts -0.02 0.13** 0.00 1.0 
      5 tweets stockmarket 0.06 ** 0.12** 0.10** 0.20** 1.0 
     6 tweets stockmarket-1 0.02 0.04 0.10** 0.01 0.46** 1.0 
    7 tweets 0.00 0.06* 0.05 0.05 0.62** 0.40** 1.0 
   8 tweets platforms -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.06** 0.00 0.21** 1.0 
  9 tweets unions 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05* -0.08** -0.02 1.0 
 10 hashtags -0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.04 0.49** 0.34** 0.90** 0.29** -0.08** 1.0 
11 hashtags platforms -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05* -0.02 0.17** 0.72** -0.02 .029** 
12 hashtags unions 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03** -0.03 0.13** -0.03 
13 links -0.02 0.07** 0.04 0.07** 0.61** 0.38** 0.96** 0.23** -0.06** 0.85** 
14 links platforms -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.13** 0.93** -0.02 0.18** 
15 links unions -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05* -0.08** -0.02 0.99** -0.07** 
16 retweets 0.06* 0.03 0.10** 0.00 0.59** 0.43** 0.82** 0.02 -0.06** 0.69** 
17 retweets platforms 0.02 0.03 0.07** 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.16** 0.36** 0.01 0.19** 
18 retweets unions 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.18** 0.05* 0.02 0.14** 
19 followers -0.02 0.07** 0.01 0.07** 0.52** 0.30** 0.87** 0.23** -0.08** 0.79** 
20 followers platforms -0.08** -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.16** 0.07** 0.41** 0.45** 0.01 0.44** 
21 followers unions 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.08** -0.02 0.74** -0.07** 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; two tailed tests 
     1 Variables definitions are reported in the notes to Table 1. 
 
Variable1 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 hashtags platforms 1.0 
          12 hashtags unions -0.03 1.0 
         13 links 0.19** -0.03 1.0 
        14 links platforms 0.52** -0.02 0.16** 1.0 
       15 links unions -0.01 0.11** -0.06** -0.02 1.0 
      16 retweets 0.01 -0.04 0.74** -0.04 -0.06** 1.0 
     17 retweets platforms 0.30** -0.02 0.16** 0.26** 0.01 0.09** 1.0 
    18 retweets unions 0.03 -0.01 0.13** 0.02 0.03 0.12** 0.43** 1.0 
   19 followers 0.19** -0.04 0.89** 0.13** -0.08** 0.66** 0.12** 0.06** 1.0 
  20 followers platforms 0.50** -0.03 0.45** 0.29** 0.00 0.16** 0.23** 0.06** 0.44** 1.0 
 21 followers unions -0.01 0.18** -0.06** -0.03 0.73** -0.07** 0.07** 0.02 -0.08** -0.02 1.0 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; two tailed tests 
1 Variables definitions are reported in the notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3. Fixed effects regression of abnormal returns, with robust standard errors 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
             Constant 0.13807 *** 0.07557 ***  0.08463 *** 0.15022 ***  0.11510 *** 0 .08008 *** 
 
(.0303) 
 
(.01488) 
 
(.0118) 
 
(.02749) 
 
(.02306) 
 
(.01528) 
 relevant facts -0.15067 * -0.13568 *  -0.13907 *  -0.12897 *  -0.08038 
 
 -0.08702 
 
 
(.075) 
 
(.07075) 
 
(.07293) 
 
(.06869) 
 
(.08772) 
 
(.08878) 
 tweets stockmarket  0.00040 ** 0.00025 **  0.00026 **  0.00039 ** -0.00001 
 
 -0.00002 
 
 
(.00015) 
 
(.00010) 
 
(.00010) 
 
(.00012) 
 
(.00016) 
 
(.00016) 
 tweets -0.00008 ** 
          
 
(.00003) 
           tweets platforms 
  
-0.00319  
         
   
(.0021) 
         tweets unions 
    
-0.05036 *** 
      
     
(.01117) 
       followers 
      
-0.00000005 *** 
    
       
(.00000001) 
    followers platforms 
        
-0.000003 ** 
  
         
(.000001) 
  followers unions 
          
 -0.00001 
 
           
(.00002) 
 R-squared 
            Within .009 
 
.006 
 
.007 
 
.01 
 
.006 
 
.0007 
 Between .11 
 
.07 
 
.10 
 
.24 
 
.48 
 
.24 
 Overall .009 
 
.006 
 
.004 
 
.01 
 
.007 
 
.0002 
 Observations 992 
 
992 
 
992 
 
992 
 
929 
 
929 
 *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; two tailed tests. 
Robust standard errors, obtained by clustering firm observations, are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. 
Variables definitions are reported in the notes to Table 1. 
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Table 4. Logit fixed effects regression of abnormal negative returns or abnormal losses 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
             relevant facts 0.12063 
 
 -0.23613 
 
-0.12207 
 
0.12150 
 
-0.28420 
 
-0.15167 
 
 
(.17289) 
 
(.26540) 
 
(.58084) 
 
(.17284) 
 
(.26691) 
 
(.56523) 
 log (tweets 
stockmarket) 
 -
0.05009 
 
0.04459 
 
0.03624 
 
-0.04708 
 
0.05269 
 
0 .05751 
 
 
(.04892) 
 
(.06700) 
 
(.12537) 
 
(.04755) 
 
(.06757) 
 
(.12921) 
 log (tweets) 0.11536 
           
 
(.10047) 
           log (tweets 
platforms) 
  
-0.05211 
         
   
(.09320) 
         log (tweets unions) 
    
0.66931 * 
      
     
(.35720) 
       log (followers) 
      
 0.09519 
     
       
(.08035) 
     log (followers 
platforms) 
        
0.14025 ** 
  
         
(.06945) 
   log (followers 
unions) 
          
-0.15970 
 
           
(.98080) 
 
             Log likelihood  -630.56 
 
-262.76 
 
-61.26 
 
-630.52 
 
-260.84 
 
-63.10 
 Observations 946 
 
405 
 
103 
 
946 
 
405 
 
103 
 *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. Variables definitions are reported in the 
notes to Table 1.  
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Table 5. Logit fixed effects regression of abnormal positive returns or abnormal profits 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
            relevant facts  -0.07626 
 
0.24185 
 
0.20007 
 
 -0.07237 
 
 0.27059 
 
0.21377 
 
(.17295) 
 
(.26681) 
 
(.56952) 
 
(.17293) 
 
(.26793) 
 
(.56267) 
log (tweets 
stockmarket)  0.04676 
 
-0.05711 
 
 -
0.03128 
 
 0.05417 
 
-0.06535 
 
-0.04381 
 
(.04886) 
 
(.06760) 
 
(.12266) 
 
(.04751) 
 
(.06815) 
 
(.12852) 
log (tweets) -0.03541 
          
 
(.10016) 
          log (tweets 
platforms) 
  
-0.00952 
        
   
(.09418) 
        log (tweets unions) 
    
-0.44894 
      
     
(.34384) 
      log (followers) 
      
-0.06424 
    
       
(.08014) 
    log (followers 
platforms) 
        
 -0.11927 * 
 
         
(.06917) 
  log (followers 
unions) 
          
0.04741 
           
(.94449) 
            Log likelihood  -632.32 
 
-259.47 
 
-63.23 
 
-632.06 
 
-257.97 
 
-64.10 
Observations 946 
 
405 
 
103 
 
946 
 
405 
 
103 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; two tailed tests. 
Standard errors are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. Variables definitions are reported in 
the notes to Table 1. 
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Table 6. Fixed effects regression of abnormal trading volume, with robust standard 
errors 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
             Constant -0.07446 ***  -0.07131 *** -0.07476 ***  -0.08316 *** -0.06250 ** -0.07254 *** 
 
(.01463) 
 
(.01826) 
 
(.02004) 
 
(.01633) 
 
(.02182) 
 
(.02070) 
 AR-1  4.1898 **  4.1947 **  4.2618 **  4.2355 **  5.2016 **  5.1695 ** 
 
(1.7844) 
 
(1.7820) 
 
(1.8123) 
 
(1.7642) 
 
(1.7109) 
 
(1.7221) 
 relevant facts 0.17273 * 0 .17010 * .17135 * 0.16960 * 0.13601 
 
0 .13429 
 
 
(.076879) 
 
(.07714) 
 
(.07686) 
 
(.07716) 
 
(.08455) 
 
(.08479) 
 tweets 
stockmarket  0.00011 * 0 .00013 **  .00013 ** 0.00010 * 0.00029 ** 0.00029 ** 
 
(.000062) 
 
(.00004) 
 
(.00004) 
 
(.00005) 
 
(.00011) 
 
(.00011) 
 tweets  0.000001 
           
 
(.00001) 
           tweets 
platforms 
  
0.00113 
         
   
(.00114) 
         tweets unions 
    
.01843 *** 
      
     
(.00484) 
       followers 
      
0.000000008 * 
    
       
(.000000004) 
     followers 
platforms 
        
 -0.000001 
   
         
(.000001) 
   followers 
unions 
          
 -0.000001 
 
           
(.000004) 
 R-squared 
            Within .06 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
.06 
 
.06 
 Between .19 
 
.21 
 
.20 
 
.23 
 
.05 
 
.06 
 Overall .04 
 
.05 
 
.05 
 
.04 
 
.06 
 
.06 
 Observations 991 
 
991 
 
991 
 
991 
 
929 
 
929 
 *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; two tailed tests. 
Robust standard errors, obtained by clustering firm observations, are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. Variables 
definitions are reported in the notes to Table 1. 
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Table 7. Fixed effects regression of firms’ abnormal trading volume minus IBEX 35 
abnormal trading volume, with robust standard errors 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
             Constant -0.05756 ***  -0.05931 ** -0.06871 **  -0.06272 *** -0.05307 **  -0.06333 ** 
 
(.01544) 
 
(.01931) 
 
(.02233) 
 
(.01560) 
 
(.01928) 
 
(.02323) 
 AR-1  1.9518 
 
 1.9569 
 
 2.0651 
 
 1.9698 
 
 2.6203 
 
 2.5682 
 
 
(1.7138) 
 
(1.7105) 
 
(1.8066) 
 
(1.7043) 
 
(1.8792) 
 
(1.8783) 
 relevant facts 0.13287 
 
0 .13191 
 
0.13237 
 
0.13201 
 
0.10974 
 
 0.10791 
 
 
(.07374) 
 
(.07361) 
 
(.07348) 
 
(.07442) 
 
(.07691) 
 
(.07707) 
 tweets 
stockmarket  0.00011 * 0 .00011 **  0.00011 ** 0.00009 * 0.00023 * 0.00023 * 
 
(.00005) 
 
(.00004) 
 
(.00004) 
 
(.00005) 
 
(.00011) 
 
(.00011) 
 tweets 0 .000001 
           
 
(.00001) 
           tweets 
platforms 
  
0.00063 
         
   
(0.00103) 
         tweets unions 
    
0.02717 ** 
      
     
(.01163) 
       followers 
      
0.000000003 
     
       
(.000000005) 
     followers 
platforms 
        
 -0.000001 
   
         
(.000001) 
   followers 
unions 
          
 -0.000001 
 
           
(.000007) 
 R-squared 
            Within .03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.04 
 
.04 
 Between .18 
 
.21 
 
.14 
 
.23 
 
.06 
 
.07 
 Overall .03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.03 
 
.04 
 
.04 
 Observations 991 
 
991 
 
991 
 
991 
 
929 
 
929 
 *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; two tailed tests. 
Robust standard errors, obtained by clustering firm observations, are reported under each coefficient in parentheses. 
Variables definitions are reported in the notes to Table 1.  
 
